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An underappreciated pathway towards a deeper EU-India strategic partnership:

India's energy transition partnerships with EU member states

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Executive Summary

- Developing green energy supply chains for green hydrogen, wind energy, and solar panel manufacturing are the crucial next steps to translate climate commitments into energy transition partnerships.
- The global energy transition offers an underappreciated pathway towards developing a deeper EU-India strategic partnership, because energy cooperation facilitates the integration of the Indian and European economies.
- There need to be more energy transition projects supported by the European Investment Bank in India, increased strategic dialogue among EU member states with the aim of forming 'coalitions of doers', and further strategic reflection in New Delhi about its institutional capacity in Europe ahead of the next EU-India Summit.



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1. Introduction

On 20 October 2025, a month after they had received the New Strategic EU-India Agenda from the European Commission, representatives from 27 EU member states convened for a Council meeting. Together, they endorsed the five pillars, or strategic objectives, of the new European strategy on India. During the meeting, they agreed that "the green transition lies at the heart of efforts to advance sustainable and inclusive economic growth." They stated that Europe views the EU-India Clean Energy and Climate Partnership as "a key framework for cooperation and welcomes the commitment to advance collaboration on safe and sustainable low-carbon energy."[1]

However, cooperation on the green transition is one amongst multiple other objectives and policy areas within the five pillar framework. This means that this cooperation risks being put low in the internal hierarchy of priorities, overshadowed by other pressing issues which the EU faces in its relations with India. There is therefore a need for member states to step in and push for a deeper clean energy partnership in the coming years. Ultimately, these states face an urgent policy question: how can the EU and India translate their energy transition commitments into deeper climate cooperation?

This UI Report will examine this question, drawing on a new dataset about green partnerships between EU member states and India. The report argues that the global energy transition offers an underappreciated pathway towards a deeper EU-India strategic partnership. This is because energy cooperation facilitates the integration of the Indian and European economies.

To understand green cooperation between the EU and India, the report proposes that it is necessary to adopt a broader analytical view of energy transitions, extending the analysis beyond energy security politics. It is also necessary to look at individual member states' relations with India. An exclusive focus on the EU-level partnership provides only a partial picture of India's broader climate and energy engagement with Europe. India simultaneously maintains climate and energy-related partnerships with individual EU member states, several of which have developed their own bilateral frameworks, sectoral priorities, and financing arrangements with New Delhi.[2] As such, this report presents analysis of a new dataset of 86 energy-related partnerships that India has entered into with EU member states, between 2007 and 2026. The report offers a unique empirical overview of the engagements which different EU member states have with India. This makes it possible to identify where energy cooperation is concentrated and where important implementation challenges remain.

At present, experts remain divided over whether a growing energy agenda can fundamentally reshape EU-India bilateral relations. Optimistic perspectives argue that the energy transition provides a strategic platform for strengthening economic competitiveness, energy security,

1 Council of the European Union (2025). Council Conclusions on the new Strategic EU-India Agenda, available at: {https://www.europarl.europa.eu/telastatic/cmsdata/299005/Council%20Conclusions%20on%20the%20New%20Strategic%20EU-India%20Agenda_20%20Oct%202025.pdf}

2 A. Nordenstam, 'India-EU Climate Relations: Mapping Diplomatic Engagements', in *Tracks to Transition: India's Global Climate Strategy* (Centre for Social and Economic Progress, 2023), available at: {https://csep.org/reports/india-eu-climate-relations-mapping-diplomatic-engagements/};

technological innovation, and geopolitical resilience, while enabling the EU and India to contribute jointly to global climate goals.[3]

Others contend that the transformative potential of the partnership should not be overstated. While acknowledging that climate and energy have become central to EU-India relations, they point to persistent barriers, including implementation challenges pertaining to announced initiatives and measurable outcomes, institutional capacity constraints, divergent development priorities, insufficient climate finance, and tensions surrounding the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).[4] Rather than questioning the importance of climate cooperation itself, the debate increasingly centres on how existing commitments can be translated into effective implementation.

The stakes are high because there are economic opportunities in the global energy transition and the planet is getting warmer. Global warming has already surpassed 1.2°C above pre-industrial levels, and the window for limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C is rapidly closing.[5] Moreover, the breakthrough of the EU-India free trade agreement in January 2026 placed conditions for economic relations on top of the agenda. A broad conception of energy transition partnerships is needed as the EU and India are expected to sign a bilateral investment agreement that could include chapters on energy and climate-related issues.

2. Background

Over time, ambitions to achieve net-zero emissions have become increasingly embedded in EU-India climate and energy relations. The EU has established a legally binding objective of climate neutrality by 2050. India has committed to achieving net-zero emissions by 2070. However, these national and collective targets mask considerable variation within both regions. European national governments and cities pursue distinctive transition pathways within the framework of the EU's broader 2050 objective. Among the frontrunners are Finland (aiming to be 'net-zero' by 2035), Austria (2040), and Germany and Sweden (2045).

Meanwhile, Indian states and cities are also increasingly developing their own differentiated climate strategies and decarbonization ambitions. For example, the Chief Minister of Telangana has announced that Hyderabad is aiming to become net-zero by 2034.[6] Mumbai and Bengaluru have adopted a 2050 net-zero target, two decades ahead of India's national commitment.[7] Moreover, the city of Gurgaon in the state of Haryana, neighbouring Delhi, is aiming for net-zero by 2050.[8] These differences make subnational actors increasingly important in translating

3 J. Scott, S. Raha, and K. Vohra, *Climate Action and Green Economy Opportunities in the EU-India Strategic Partnership* (Heinrich Böll Stiftung New Delhi, 2025), pp. 1–6; S. Yashwant and S. Harmeling, EU-India Climate Cooperation Brief (Climate Action Network Europe and South Asia, 2023), pp. 1–26, available at: {https://cansouthasia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/EU-INDIA-CLIMATE-COOPERATION-BRIEF.pdf}

4 A., Nordenstam. (2023); N. Kabra and A. Mukund, *India's NDC 3.0: Opportunities for Enhanced EU-India Cooperation on Climate Adaptation* (Generation EU-India, 2026), Policy Brief No. 2, pp. 1–8, available at: {https://generationeuindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/indias-ndc-3.0_-opportunities-for-enhanced-eu-india-cooperation-on-climate-adaptation.docx-1.pdf}.

5 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), *Global Warming of 1.5°C* (IPCC, 2020), available at: {https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/}

6 R. Ali, 'Hyderabad to Be Net Zero City by 2034, Says Revanth', *Times of India* (18 February 2026), available at: {https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/hyderabad-to-be-net-zero-city-by-2034-says-revanth/articleshow/128513767.cms}

7 World Resources Institute India (WRI India), 'Mumbai Climate Action Plan (MCAP)', available at: {https://wri-india.org/initiatives/mumbai-climate-action-plan-mcap}; World Resources Institute India (WRI India), 'Bengaluru Climate Action and Resilience Plan (BCAP)', available at: {https://wri-india.org/initiatives/bengaluru-climate-action-and-resilience-plan-bcap}.

8 I. Pati, 'Net Zero: Gurgaon Comes Up with 2050 Roadmap', *Times of India* (21 November 2023), available at: {https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/gurgaon/net-zero-city-comes-up-with-2050-roadmap/articleshow/105369868.cms}.

climate ambitions into policy, infrastructure, and investment.

Another significant development is the growing role of subnational action in India's urban transition. This highlights the importance of the EU's local-level engagement in advancing the energy transition. The European Investment Bank (EIB) supports metro and rail infrastructure projects in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Madhya Pradesh. Since 2014, the EIB has granted loans for the construction of metros and rail mobility in, for instance, Agra (EUR 450 million), Bengaluru (EUR 800 million), and Bhopal (EUR 400 million).[9] One example is the Agra Metro Rail project, which involves the development of two interconnected metro lines aimed at shifting urban mobility towards lower-emission public transport. The EIB has also allocated EUR 1.7 billion to energy transition projects in India, including investment funds, solar, and photovoltaic (PV).[10] Between 1993 and 2025, the EIB granted EUR 6.3 billion in financing to India.

3. Understanding the diversity of EU member states' engagement with India

In this section, we present the findings from the analysis. Based on the coding, we visualised the level of EU member states' engagement with India on energy issues in a circular pattern, where distance from the centre corresponds to degree of engagement.[11] We group EU member states into three concentric circles that represent different levels of cooperation with India (Figure 1).

The first circle, in the centre, features member states which have substantial engagement with India on energy issues. This engagement is characterized by structured diplomatic partnerships and sustained activities over time. Our analysis suggests that, based on their engagement with India, four EU member states fall within this circle: Germany, France, Denmark, and Sweden. Between the first and second circles, we place the Netherlands.

The second circle, or the middle ring of the diagram, features those member states whose partnerships are characterized by active engagement, but have less developed relations with India than those within the first circle. Attaining a position in this circle is generally easier for EU member states than securing a place in the first circle, according to our analysis. Our analysis suggests that Belgium, Finland, Italy, Austria, Portugal, and Spain can be situated within the second circle.

The third circle, or the outer ring of the diagram, has those member states whose engagement with India is limited, contested, or absent. The

9 European Investment Bank, 'Projects and Loans in India' (2026), available at: {https://www.eib.org/en/projects/loans/index.htm?sortColumn=loanParts.loanPartStatus.statusDate&sortDir=desc&pageNumber=0&itemPerPage=25&pageable=true&la=EN&deLa=EN&orLoanPartYearFrom=true&orLoanPartYearTo=true&orCountries.region=true&countries=IN&orCountries=true&orSectors=true}.


10 Ibid.

11 In previous studies that have used this methodology, these circles have typically been labelled as the "first" and "second" circle, where these correspond to "low" and "high" engagement. For instance, Jain was the first scholar to use circles as an analytical heuristic in EU-India relations. This was then developed into a more comprehensive methodology by Aspengren, Lidén, and Nordenstam. See Rajendra K., Jain. *India and the European Union: Perceptions and Policies,* Paper presented at the European studies in Asia (ESiA) Network Public Panel, Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 19 June 2009, 1-5; H. C. Aspengren, E. Lidén, and A. Nordenstam, *Circles of EU-India Engagement: How Member States Cooperate with India on Global Issues* (Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2021), UI Paper No. 1, pp. 1–29, available at: {https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/2021/ui-paper-no.-1-2021.pdf}. S. Saini and H. Björklund, Accelerating EU-India Critical Tech Cooperation: Drivers for Digital Synergy (Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2025), UI Brief No. 9, available at: {https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/2025/ui-brief-no.-9-2025.pdf}.

countries situated in the third circle have the least advanced partnerships. In some cases, the engagement is best described as absent. In our visualisation, EU member states with little engagement are located closer to the inner boundary of this ring, whereas those positioned on the outside have largely non-existent engagement.

The reasons why these member states in the third circle have such limited engagement with India on climate and energy-transition issues may vary from case to case. However, their lack of engagement may be because these states lack interest in building energy partnerships or choose to rely on EU-level engagement instead of pursuing their own partnerships. It may also be because these states have more limited governmental capacity to support the private sector. Future research could explore the absence of engagement found amongst these EU member states. It could also investigate the motives which drive some other EU member states to pursue deeper or upgraded forms of cooperation.

Figure 1.
Energy relations between India and EU27.



Source: Authors' compilation.
Nordenstam & Chatterjee (2026)

3.1 Patterns of engagements in the circles

This section of the report discusses the patterns of engagement with India which were displayed by the member states in the three circles. To structure the findings, we discuss the cooperation between EU member states and India for each of the different fuel types in turn.

Solar energy

During the Indian Prime Minister Modi's first and second terms, a number of different EU member states have sought to support the build-up of India's domestic solar energy capacity. The way in which these member states have cooperated with India to advance solar energy capacity in the country places them into the first and second circles of engagement. On the Indian side, the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy has played a key role in fostering these partnerships with European states. Meanwhile, the India-headquartered International Solar Alliance has also attracted European states as members.[12]

The growing attention to solar energy cooperation reflects India's domestic objectives of expanding solar energy capacity. At COP26 in Glasgow, Modi announced a target of 500 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030. In the run-up to COP31 in Türkiye, the Indian Union Cabinet agreed to increase the goal to 900 GW by 2035.[13]

In response to India's green ambitions and persistent financing needs, several European states have increased their investment. For

12 On EU member states in the International Solar Alliance, see next section of this UI Report.
13 'Green energy scheme "big push" towards achieving 900 GW non-fossil capacity by 2035: PM Modi', DD India (1 October 2026), available at: DD India article on green energy scheme, accessed 7 October 2026.

instance, expanding solar energy manufacturing is one of the goals of the India-Germany Platform for Investment in Renewable Energy Worldwide.[14] Similarly, Swedish and Danish entities have supported the establishment of business projects and have encouraged technology transfer by firms and research institutes, seeking to be part of India's energy transitions.[15]

This cooperation between some EU member states and India on solar energy research and clean technologies is not new. Germany was early in fostering joint research and development through the Indo-German Solar Energy Partnership, which was signed in 2015. The partnership contributed to Germany's position in the first circle. By then, India had also entered into MoUs on renewable energy with Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, France, and Belgium, where these partnerships made references to potential solar energy cooperation. Building on these MoUs, a web of Joint Working Groups (JWGs) emerged. Some of these JWGs have convened regularly over the years, whereas others have reported little activity. For the countries that the analysis found to be positioned within the first and second circles of engagement, the institutional platforms established to further climate cooperation therefore typically include partnerships on solar energy.

Wind energy

There are a growing number of green partnerships between India and different EU member states on wind energy. These partnerships are partly in response to the great potential for energy to be generated by wind in India, where the Indian government has estimated that wind energy could contribute around 1,164 GW.[16] Most of these partnerships between particular EU member states and India are related to onshore and offshore activities in India, but one exception is the investments in wind energy plants in Croatia.[17] The partnerships are sometimes supported by a joint working group on renewable energy, but this is not always the case.

Amongst the EU member states, many of the front-runners entered into wind energy partnerships with India approximately 15-20 years ago. Early on, in 2006, the Indo-German Energy Forum was launched, connecting German and Indian stakeholders active in renewable energy, including wind power. Following this, other member states have progressively established partnerships, including Spain (2009), Sweden (2010), and Belgium (2012). These states entered into these partnerships as a means of signalling interest and facilitating private sector engagement. They partnered with India to establish frameworks for workshops, knowledge-sharing, technical assistance, research and development, and demonstration projects.

Over time, an additional group of EU member states have signed MoUs with India that included provisions for wind energy cooperation. This group includes France (2015), Greece (2017), Spain (2017), Portugal (2017), and Finland (2022). All of these, except France, are in the second circle of EU-India energy engagements. As green

14 'India–Germany Joint Statement', Press Information Bureau, Government of India (12 January 2026), available at: India–Germany Joint Statement, accessed 7 October 2026.
15 For instance, India-Sweden Innovations Accelerator (sponsored by the Swedish Energy Agency) and the Danish Export Credit Agency.
16 NITI Aayog, 'Wind Potential', India Climate & Energy Dashboard (ICED), available at: India Climate & Energy Dashboard, accessed 7 October 2026.
17 Embassy of India in Zagreb, 'Economic Relations', available at: Economic Relations | Embassy of India, Croatia, Zagreb, accessed 7 October 2026.

technologies have matured and the private sector has expanded its capabilities, India has attracted more international support to its low carbon energy transitions.

In this context, a partnership between Denmark and India emerged in 2020. This partnership helps to place Denmark within the first circle that includes those EU member states that have the highest levels of energy engagements with India. Since 2020, Copenhagen and New Delhi have implemented a Green Strategic Partnership that has a strong focus on offshore wind energy cooperation. In this partnership, Denmark provides technical assistance to support India's offshore wind sector. It has done so by cooperating with India to jointly establish a Centre of Excellence. It has also done so through the India-Denmark Energy Partnership, which is now in its second phase, and by building on the strategic sector cooperation on offshore wind that the two states agreed to pursue in 2018. According to this Action Plan, Denmark and India aim to "set up a taskforce to lay the groundwork for the development of a large-scale offshore project."[18] The resources Denmark has invested in wind energy cooperation place it firmly within the first circle of India-EU energy engagements.

Green hydrogen

India is trying to establish a domestic green hydrogen production infrastructure with support from European partners. Scholars understand this push as:

> The dawn of a new, shared and positive energy future imaginary. It is – at this point – indeed an imaginary, as India still heavily relies on domestic and imported coal for its expanding energy needs, and the EU has dealt with the sudden breakdown of Russian gas supplies by developing new fossil-fuel based partnerships elsewhere in the world.[19]

According to our dataset, almost half of the EU member states have agreed to work together with India on green hydrogen. This growing European engagement can be seen as a result of the ambitious plans set out in India's Green Hydrogen Mission. This Mission was first announced by the Prime Minister Narendra Modi in November 2020 and adopted officially in early 2023. The Indian government describes the Mission as part of "India's ambition to emerge as a global leader in the production and export of green hydrogen." It states that India aims to do so by achieving a "production capacity of 5 million tonnes per annum of Green Hydrogen by 2030."[20] These ambitions have attracted considerable attention among European countries seeking to deepen their economic and energy partnerships with India.

In 2022, Germany and France took the lead in recognising India's attempts to become an important actor in the emerging global green hydrogen economy. Germany established a partnership with India on green hydrogen. This partnership holds a particularly prominent position in the increasing EU-India cooperation on green hydrogen. The partnership between

18 Government of India and Government of Denmark, *India-Denmark Joint Action Plan (2021–2026): Green Strategic Partnership* (2021), available at: India-Denmark Joint Action Plan (2021–2026), accessed 7 October 2026, 6.

19 M. Prys-Hansen and S. Kaack. India, the inevitable? How the war in Ukraine shapes EU-India energy relations, *Czech Journal of International Relations*, 58 (2), p. 129. Available: https://doi.org/10.32422/cjir.744

20 Press Information Bureau, *National Green Hydrogen Mission: Transforming India's Energy Landscape* (22 June 2024), available at: National Green Hydrogen Mission, accessed 7 October 2026.

Germany and India has been supported by a detailed roadmap, which was signed in 2022, and has also been complemented by a EUR 1.2 billion project at the Mulapeta port on India's east coast.[21]

Alongside Germany, France has emerged as another key partner. India and France have agreed to cooperate on regulatory standards and production capacity in the next two decades.[22] The partnerships which Germany and France have established with India on green hydrogen contribute to their positions in the first circle amongst the group of states with the highest level of engagement.

However, it is not only Germany and France that have established partnerships with India on green hydrogen. A 2025 report by the Indian Council on World Affairs (ICWA), a think tank funded by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, states that "apart from Germany, India is also negotiating with France and Italy and is also considering Austria and Sweden for export opportunities in Europe."[23]

At the same time, the Netherlands has also sought to increase its engagement with India in this sector. The Netherlands has presented itself as a gateway to the European market by developing "green corridors" and "promoting India's green hydrogen exports by integrating domestic production capacities with the European markets." This cooperation on green hydrogen helps to move its position closer to the first circle.[24]

The increasing number of partnerships between EU member states and India on green hydrogen has also been spurred by actions taken on the Indian side. Indian representatives have conducted outreach in European countries to attract European attention and finance. Visits by Indian ministers and the President to countries such as Estonia and Romania illustrate these efforts.[25]

Hence, multiple initiatives have laid the foundations of an India-Europe green hydrogen supply chain over the past five years. The challenge in the coming years will be to translate political commitments and initiatives into commercial flows. Hydrogen has become an important component of India's broader strategy for engaging Europe in the global energy transition.

Critical raw minerals

Critical raw minerals constitute an area of cooperation which is drawing growing interest and is viewed as increasingly relevant to the energy transition.[26] In 2025, India launched its Critical Mineral Mission. The Mission's implementation phase runs from 2025 to 2031.

21 Government of the Republic of India and Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, Indo-German Green Hydrogen Roadmap (2024), available at: Indo-German Green Hydrogen Roadmap, accessed 7 October 2026.

22 Government of India and Government of France, Horizon 2047: *25th Anniversary of the India-France Strategic Partnership, Towards a Century of India-France Relations* (14 July 2023), available at: Horizon 2047: 25th Anniversary of the India-France Strategic Partnership, Towards a Century of India-France Relations, accessed 7 October 2026.

23 Mann, Renu, 2025. India-Germany Emerging Green Hydrogen Partnership, *Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)*, Special Report. 23 June 2025. Available: India-Germany Emerging Green Hydrogen Partnership - Indian Council of World Affairs (Government of India)

24 Government of India and Government of the Netherlands, *Roadmap of India-Netherlands Strategic Partnership (2026–2030)* (16 May 2026), available at: Roadmap of India-Netherlands Strategic Partnership (2026–2030), accessed 7 October 2026.

25 Press Information Bureau, 'Union Minister of Commerce and Industry Shri Piyush Goyal concludes successful visit to Spain, Belgium, Finland and Estonia; strengthens India's economic partnership with Europe' (19 July 2026), available at: Press Information Bureau release, accessed 7 October 2026; President of India, 'English Translation of the Press Statement by the Hon'ble President During State Visit to Romania' (Bucharest, 23 July 2026), available at: Press statement during State Visit to Romania, accessed 7 October 2026.

26 Zainab Usman and Vivek Shastry, 2026. 'India's Critical Minerals Industrial Policy Balances Domestic Ambitions and Transnational Challenges', Commentary, *Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs*, available at: https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/

This aims "to secure a place for India as a global player in the emerging green economy" and to "accelerate the development and commercialization of homegrown technologies vital for India's energy transition and strategic industries."[27] International partners have noted that India is investing considerable state capacity and resources in carrying out the mission. This is something that therefore provides much potential for cooperation. India has sought cooperation with international partners such as the US, Japan, Australia, and several European countries, while also deliberately excluding engagement with China.[28]

Germany and the Netherlands have signed declarations of intent and MoUs with India. This highlights their willingness to build partnerships on critical raw minerals, research and development, and resilient supply chains. In forward-looking action plans, India has agreed to cooperate on supply chain diversification with the Netherlands, and on mining technology with Sweden and Poland. Italy has also positioned itself among the group of European countries cooperating with India on critical minerals by including critical raw minerals in its Special Strategic Partnership on Clean Energy. There is therefore a sizeable group of European countries which are trying to position themselves as supporters of India's clean energy transition by cooperating with it on critical raw minerals.

Nuclear energy

Another fuel type with significant relevance for the energy transition is nuclear energy. France has positioned itself as India's principal European partner in the nuclear energy sector. Evidence of this is found in the long-term roadmap guiding cooperation between France and India Horizon 2047, which was signed in 2023. In this, the two close partners signalled a long-term commitment to bilateral cooperation. They stated that they "share the conviction that sustainable solutions in the fight against climate change include the use of nuclear energy."[29]

Although nuclear energy is critical for energy security, India's partnerships with EU member states on nuclear energy also sometimes have another dimension. In some cases, nuclear energy cooperation is seen as part of science and technology cooperation or as a way to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This is the case for Finland, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic. In India's cooperation with France, all these motives feature in the analysed documents. Amongst the partnerships on nuclear energy which India has with EU member states, the relationship between France and India represents the deepest level of cooperation. This helps to place France firmly in the group of states that fall in the first circle, having the highest level of engagement with India.

Natural gas

For decades, there was minimal cooperation between India and European partners on natural

publications/https-www-energypolicy-columbia-edu-indias-critical-minerals-industrial-policy-balancesdomestic-ambitions-and-transnational-challenges/, accessed 1 November 2026.

27 Press Information Bureau, 'India's Critical Mineral Mission: Securing the Minerals of Tomorrow' (6 September 2025), available at: India's Critical Mineral Mission: Securing the Minerals of Tomorrow, accessed 7 October 2026.

28 Anindita Sinh and Constantino Xavier, Partnerships for Self-Reliance: Internationalising India's Critical Minerals Sector, CSEP Working Paper 107 (Centre for Social and Economic Progress, 2025), available at: Partnerships for Self-Reliance: Internationalising India's Critical Minerals Sector, accessed 7 October 2026.

29 Government of India and Government of France, *Horizon 2047.*

gas. Now, however, there are indications that natural gas may take a greater role in EU-India energy relations. Starting from January 2028, and for the following ten years, the European company Uniper will supply liquified natural gas (LNG) to the Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation in west India.[30]

The establishment of this energy corridor is an attempt by India to deepen its value chains to Europe, while also maintaining its ties to other natural gas suppliers, notably Qatar, Australia, and the United Arab Emirates.[31]

The growing attention India is paying to cooperation on natural gas is also seen in recent outreach efforts by the Indian Minister for Petroleum and Natural Gas, Hardeep Singh. For example, in his 2024 speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Singh told the world's elites that "for a country like India, which now has the largest population in the world, it requires a transition to sustainability without jeopardizing or undermining the need to deliver basic welfare to a large and growing population."[32] However, there are no indications that natural gas relations will replace other forms of energy relations.

In sum, this mapping of partnerships between EU member states and India on efforts to carry out the energy transition has shown that engagement varies considerably. Member states such as Germany, France, Denmark, and Sweden demonstrate substantial cooperation. The Netherlands occupies an intermediate position, reflecting its efforts to deepen collaboration on renewable energy, green hydrogen, and critical raw minerals. Meanwhile, other member states display little or no engagement across the different energy sectors and therefore fall within the third circle, or outer ring, with low levels of cooperation. The presence of countries in the first and second circles should therefore be understood as an indication of their commitment to engagement. Further research could evaluate these partnerships in EU-India energy relations and explore why some EU member states are very active in establishing partnerships, placing them in the first and second circles, whilst others remain inactive and are therefore located in the third circle.

3.2 India and EU member states in four climate institutions

The new dataset formed for this report also provides an updated overview of the engagement that different EU member states have with India when they participate together in multilateral platforms (Figure 2).

In the past decade, India has decided to co-lead four different climate cooperation institutions – the International Solar Alliance (ISA), the Leadership Group for Industry Transition (LeadIT), the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), and the Global Biofuel Alliance. To a varying degree, EU member states have cooperated with India within these different institutions.

30 Uniper, 'Uniper and GSPC Sign Long-Term LNG Supply Agreement into India' (20 February 2026), available at: Uniper and GSPC Sign Long-Term LNG Supply Agreement into India, accessed 7 October 2026.
31 International Energy Agency (IEA), 'Total LNG Imports and Volumes Under Long-Term Contracts by Source and by Calendar Year in India, 2015–2030', available at: IEA data chart on LNG imports and long-term contracts in India, accessed 7 October 2026.
32 Pooja Chhabria, 'From Navigating Global Headwinds to Endorsing Responsible AI: 5 Key Themes from India at Davos 2024', World Economic Forum (19 January 2024), available at: World Economic Forum article, accessed 7 October 2026.

These four institutions were all launched in conjunction with important international events. Notably, they all did not exist before the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015, and their establishment can in part be seen as the result of momentum generated by this landmark agreement. Some of the institutions have secretariats, whereas others lack permanent staff overseeing everyday operations. EU member states have decided to join some of these institutions and even co-lead them with India. In this section, we describe the varying membership of EU states in these recently established, and India-led, collaborative formats.[33]

The largest European participation can be found in the International Solar Alliance (ISA). Fourteen EU member states have joined the ISA since it was launched at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21), held in Paris in 2015. Notably, five of these joined the ISA between 2023 and 2026. A potential reason for this could be that the ISA's regional meetings in Brussels have started to form a meaningful hub for technical cooperation. During these meetings, representatives from technical agencies interact and seek a common view on the ISA's role in the global energy transition. Some EU member states, such as Denmark for example, seek cooperation with India "by sharing lessons and good practice" in the ISA.[34] However, further research would be needed to more comprehensively understand the reasoning behind the participation of EU member states in the ISA.

In 2023, nine EU states were members of the Leadership Group for Industry Transition (LeadIT). There has been no change in EU member state participation during the past three years. This means that during the first phase following the establishment of LeadIT, nine EU member states signed up to the platform, but there has subsequently been no further expansion in EU state participation during the second phase. The third phase of LeadIT was initially announced in Gothenburg, in May 2026, and launched in Antalya, in November 2026.[35]

The Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) counts four EU states as members, while the EU as a whole has joined on as a partner organisation. Similar to LeadIT, the CDRI has not seen an expansion in its European membership base in the past three years.


During India's G20 presidency in 2023, the Global Biofuel Alliance was launched. This new institution has attracted three EU states as members thus far, namely Italy, the Netherlands, and Hungary.

The map (Figure 2) below illustrates the variation among the participation of EU member in these climate institutions.

33 For a previous mapping, see Nordenstam 2023.
34 Government of India and Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, *India-Denmark Joint Action Plan*, p. 31.
35 Leadership Group for Industry Transition, *Framework for the next phase of the Leadership Group for Industry Transition (2027-2030)*, available at: https://www.industrytransition.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/LeadIT-3.0-framework.pdf

Figure 2. EU Member States in Climate Institutions Co-led by India

Membership in International Solar Alliance (ISA), Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), Leadership Group for Industry Transition (LeadIT), or Global Biofuel Alliance



Map: Axel Nordenstam and Annesha Chatterjee (2026) • Source: Author's analysis of websites (as of 31 July 2026) • Created with Datawrapper

4. Implications and policy recommendations

Different EU member states have established their own green partnerships with India, where many of these relate to bringing about energy transitions. These bilateral partnerships have been established alongside the wider EU-India Clean Energy and Climate Partnership, which was signed in 2016. To accelerate their respective energy transitions, Indian and European partners need to treat these different types of partnerships as complementary rather than competing. The urgency of accelerating global energy transitions demands that both sides embrace many forms of cooperation between them. Failure to pursue these forms of cooperation, and to take advantage of the economic opportunities which exist, may result in other actors drawing closer to each other, for instance leading to closer ties between some EU member states and China, or between India and China. Moreover, the price of inaction could deepen divisions in global climate politics and undermine any promising act of international solidarity.

Drawing on the analysis in this report, we make five policy recommendations:

- **Selected Members of the European Council should aim to form *'coalitions of doers'* that can lead the way in energy transition cooperation with India.** In preparation for a European Council meeting with an Indian high-level guest, diplomats should form coalitions willing to step up their engagement with India. These coalitions should focus on delivering concrete results from already announced partnerships. These coalitions could bring together Indian state government representatives, civil society, the private sector, and EU member state representatives – forming a public-private grouping which can drive cooperation forwards.

- **First circle countries should take the lead in advocating for enhanced engagement by the European Investment Bank (EIB) in India. They should push for more funding to be allocated to energy transition projects in India.**[36] These member states should pro-actively encourage the EIB to scale up its support for energy transition projects in Indian states to foster just transitions. For instance, by combining energy transition with urban mobility projects in Indian cities, the EIB could contribute to an acceleration of clean energy transitions in India.

- **The EU member states that are members in three out of four climate institutions could convene with each other. By allying they can coordinate strategic discussions about European memberships in climate institutions co-lead by India.** They should formulate strategies to engage other member states that have high or moderately high-level partnerships with India, or those in

36 This policy recommendation has been put forward in the past and remains valid. See Henrik Chetan Aspengren and Axel Nordenstam, *The Partnership Shift: Analysing the European Union's Engagement with India*, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (2019), UI Paper no.9, July 2019, p. 15, available at: {https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/2019/ui-paper-no.-9-2019.pdf}

the first and second circles, fostering greater European representation in the institutions in the future.

- **The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in New Delhi could utilise its missions across the EU to map potential opportunities for cooperation on energy transitions.** The MEA could request an update from its missions in different EU member states, where this would include an assessment of what increased engagement with the member state might look like, together with evaluations about the potential benefits from sending energy diplomats to different European states. Such mapping efforts, combined with greater institutional capacity, are critical for navigating the circles of EU-India engagement in the global energy transition.

- **The Indian Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Ministry of New Renewable Energy could convene discussions on how to better appeal to those EU member states that currently have low levels of engagement with India on green issues, or those in the third circle.** A discussion about allocating more resources to European outreach may be needed. While discussing outreach options for EU member states in the third circle, it is essential to also maintain engagement with the EU member states in the first and second circles.

Report | Nr 6 2026

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